We examine nine changes in New York State Security Transaction Taxes (STT) between 1932 and 1981. We find that imposing or increasing an STT is associated with wider bid-ask spreads, lower volume, and increased price impact of trades. In contrast to theories of STT imposition as a means to reduce volatility, we find no consistent relationship between the level of an STT and volatility.
We examine the propensity of traders to switch trading locations to avoid the tax and find no consistent evidence that they will change locations. Overall we conclude that an STT harms market quality. For decades advocates of STTs have argued that the tax can be used to raise significant tax revenue while discouraging destabilizing speculative trading and limiting excess volatility by ‗throw [ing] sand in the wheels' of financial markets.
Opponents of STTs, in contrast, argue that an STT will harm market quality by reducing volume, increasing price volatility and causing inefficient price discovery. They contend that an STT can lead to lower asset prices, an increased cost of capital for businesses, lower returns to savings and widespread tax evasion. This debate is frequently revisited, yet no consensus on the impact of STTs has been reached. The issue though has immediate policy implications, and is of great interest to policymakers, academics and politicians.
Empirical studies examining the implications of an STT either use a quasi-tax, 2 test smaller markets which do not provide a variety of firm sizes, or look at international market competition where a lack of fungibility inhibits the transfer of volume from one exchange to another. Further, there is no existing empirical 1 Smith, Geoffrey T. 2011. -Germany, France Press EU on Transaction Tax‖ Wall Street Journal September 9. 2 A quasi-tax is a fixed financial payment required to trade (e.g. fixed commissions).
study of the impact of a U.S. imposed STT on market quality. 3 Nor is there an empirical study that examines the direct impact of a security transaction tax on equity spreads. This paper strives to fill that void by examining nine changes in the level of an STT imposed by New York State from 1905 to 1981. This is the first paper to comprehensively examine the impact of a U.S. imposed STT on various measures of market quality. In addition, unlike previous studies that observe the transfer of volume across country borders, our dataset offers the opportunity to test the hypothesis that an STT in New York State shifts volume from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to U.S. regional exchanges.
While proponents of STTs argue that the imposition or increase in the tax will reduce speculative trading and thus volatility, we find no significant relationship between an STT and volatility. Being the first paper to empirically examine the impact an STT has on spreads, we find that an increase in the level of the STT is accompanied by an increase in spreads. Consistent with previous literature we find that volume moves in the opposite direction of the tax change. Finally, we find a direct relationship between STTs and price impact. Taken together we find that an STT harms market quality.
In the following section, we review the regulatory history of U.S. STTs at both the state and federal level. We then review existing theoretical and empirical work in section III. Section IV describes our data and presents our methodology, Section V contains results and is followed by our conclusions in section VI.
II. Regulatory History
The first New York State transfer tax was imposed on June 1, 1905 at the rate of two cents per $100 of par value on stocks traded, transferred, or delivered in 3 Amihud and Mendelson (1992) argue that a STT of 0.5 percent will increase transaction costs. Employing a model of asset pricing with transaction costs they project that a 0.5 percent STT will increase the average firm cost of capital by 1.3 percent and reduce the average NYSE stock price by 13.8 percent.
New York State. 4 The tax was not implemented as a financial stability measure, but a revenue generator and was estimated to produce annual revenues of $5,000,000 to make up for the state deficit. 5 The original law contained a graduated tax schedule for stocks with par values below $100. In 1906, the New York legislature passed an amendment to the law which eliminated the graduated schedule for stocks with par values less than $100. In January of 1907 that amendment was declared unconstitutional and the graduated schedule was reinstated. Seven years later in response to some companies issuing stock with no par value, the law was amended to place a two cent tax on shares issued without par value. 6 Suffering under the weight of the Great Depression, New York The intermarket trading system is an electronic linkage system that links together U.S. equity exchanges and 100% of the tax was rebated on all orders placed through ITS so that the tax would not hinder market competition. As a result, non-residents could avoid the tax entirely by placing orders through ITS.
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III. Literature Review
Theoretical papers have not reached a consensus on the impact of STTs on market quality. Some argue that an STT will improve market quality, while others argue that it will reduce it. Still others state that the effect is ambiguous.
Following is a review of the different camps in this ongoing debate.
The earliest proponents of STTs, Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1978) , argue that an STT will improve market quality. In particular, Keynes contends that chasing short-term returns, while potentially profitable to some, is a zero-sum game in terms of economic welfare. Since one investor's gain is another's loss and trading utilizes resources, the value-added through trading is negative. As a result, imposing an STT may increase welfare by reducing wasted resources. Second, since trading is speculative by nature, it potentially contributes to financial instability when trades are driven by short-term capital gains and not fundamental information. Keynes argues that an STT will curtail short-term speculation, and thereby reduce wasted resources, market volatility and asset mispricing.
Consistent with Keynes, Tobin (1978) proposes a tax on foreign exchange transactions that would make short term currency trading unprofitable. He suggests that a transaction tax would "throw some sand in the wheels of speculation." Consistent with these arguments, Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and Summers (1989) argue that an STT targets short-term noise traders whose trades contribute to excess market volatility. Therefore, an STT is associated with a reduction in volatility. Stiglitz (1989) further argues that the impact of an STT on market liquidity would be insignificant. He contends that although an STT will lead to thinner markets, the change in spread will be insignificant since the extra time that market-makers hold securities will not yield a significant change in the inventory risk component of the spread.
In stark contrast to the proponents of an STT, the opponents argue that an STT will have an adverse impact on market quality. In particular, Kupiec (1991) develops a model where an STT is directly related to excess volatility. Similarly, Amihud and Mendelson (2003) conclude that an STT is directly related to volatility since STTs reduce the amount of informed trading, thereby widening the gap between the transaction prices and the security's fundamental value. Schwert and Seguin (1993) suggest that there is no evidence of excess volatility and since the tax is a burden on all traders, the reduction in trading will not limit the activity of noise traders alone-it will affect liquidity traders and pricestabilizing informed traders as well. Therefore, the impact of the tax on volatility is ambiguous. The authors also argue that an STT would indirectly increase transaction costs through the three components of the bid-ask spread: order processing costs, inventory risk and information asymmetry. 20 For example, since an STT reduces trading volume, the number of trades available for the marketmaker to recover his fixed cost declines, thereby increasing the order processing component of the spread.
20
The order processing component is part of the fixed cost the market-maker charges for trade execution. The inventory risk component is the market-maker's compensation for holding onto risky assets. The information asymmetry component represents the likelihood that a market-maker is facing an informed trader who has superior knowledge of the asset's fundamental value.
21 An STT will also increase the order processing component directly due to the cost of collecting the tax. Second, because equity market-makers use derivatives to hedge their risky inventory positions, an STT on derivatives increases the cost of hedging their positions. The increase in the market-maker's cost for hedging increases the inventory risk part of the Just as the theoretical literature is divided on the impact of STTs on market quality, so too is the empirical literature. Apart from Roll (1989) , which performs cross-country regressions, the eleven empirical studies examine 28 different STT tax (and quasi-tax) changes in 11 different countries. We summarize the empirical literature in Table 1 and discuss it below. For each paper we list the change in percentage tax (quasi-tax) for each event since there may be a relationship between the size of the change and the impact on volatility. We also list for each paper the measures examined in the paper as well as the finding for each measure.
Statistically significant findings are indicated by an asterisk, otherwise the finding is insignificant. Rather than discussing each paper separately we will focus on the findings for each measure of market quality examined.
A. Volatility
Of the nine papers that empirically examine changes in volatility around changes in STTs, only one (Roll (1989) ) finds the inverse relationship predicted by Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and Summers (1989) . That relationship is, however not significant. Two of the papers (Baltagi, Li, and Li (2006) and Jones and Seguin (1997) ) find a statistically significant direct relationship between volatility and the level of an STT which supports the predictions of Kupiec (1991) and Amihud and Mendelson (2003) . The remaining papers either find an insignificant direct relationship (Umlauf (1993) and Hau (2006)) or conclude that they find no relationship.
bid-ask spread. Finally, if an STT reduces the amount of noise trading, as proponents suggest, then the possibility of the market-maker facing an informed trader increases, thereby increasing the information asymmetry element of the bid-ask spread.
B. Volume
Each of the five studies that examine the relationship between volume and an STT find evidence of an inverse relationship. Baltagi, Li, and Li (2006) (1993) , finds that an increase in a securities transaction tax is associated with a decline in market share in the domestic country. Existing studies may not be able to capture the true level of volume transferred between exchanges due to currency risk concerns as well as the lack of fungibility existing across borders.
C. Spreads
Prior to this study there has been a lack of empirical evidence of the impact of an STT on spread. The literature on the impact of stock transaction taxes on spreads largely relies on the indirect effect of trading volume on liquidity.
Bloomfield, O'Hara and Saar (2009) (2006) use the total price impact as a proxy for spreads and find no significant effect on spreads or price impact.
The empirical literature does not reach a consensus. By empirically examining nine changes in the level of an STT in the same market with market share not being clouded by fungibility, this paper adds to the empirical literature on STTs.
IV. Data and Methodology
We obtain dates for changes in the level of security transaction taxes at the state and federal level from the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. As stated earlier, in addition to the federal stock transfer tax instituted in 1914, the states of New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania all enacted STTs during the last century. As previously shown, the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania taxes were minuscule so they are ignored. Since one goal of this paper is to examine whether traders move their trading to avoid taxes, we do not examine the nationwide federal tax. We then focus on changes in the New York STT from its imposition In their study of the elimination of fixed commissions, Jones and Seguin (1997) employ NASDAQ stocks as a control sample. During the period of our study, Table 2 reports cross-sectional means of market values, stock prices, and our daily return standard deviation measure of volatility based on continuously compounded returns for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks for each tax change.
For NYSE/AMEX stocks we observe that the average price is fairly stable over the entire sample period. We also note that volatility is fairly stable around each NYSE/AMEX STT change from 1945 on. For the NASDAQ stocks we observe that the firms are smaller than NYSE/AMEX firms and exhibit lower average prices than those of the NYSE/AMEX. Note that our sample of NASDAQ stocks has lower average volatility than the NYSE/AMEX sample. This is consistent with the findings of Jones and Seguin (1997) .
To obtain an estimate of the change in volatility following a tax change, we regress the standard deviation of each portfolio on a dummy variable I Post,t which takes the value 1 if the day is after the tax change, otherwise zero or, , where x represents the total volume on exchange x in month t. To calculate impacts we average market share for each exchange over either the pre or post period.
The final market quality measure we examine is price impact. If an STT reduces volume then we would expect trades to have larger price impact, ceteris paribus.
Again, due to data limitations during the period of our study we rely on lowfrequency proxies for price impact. We rely on the Amihud (2002) In the next section we discuss the results of tests to measure changes in our market quality measures around STT changes.
V. Results
The first market quality measure we examine is volatility. Recall that proponents of an STT argue that the imposition or increase in the tax will reduce speculation and hence volatility. Therefore they predict an inverse relationship between an STT and volatility. However, only one (Roll (1989)) of the nine empirical papers cited in Table 1 The results of our regressions are found in Table 3 parameter estimates in column four reveals that in five instances volatility appeared to change in the direction of the tax change (1932, 1933, 1966, 1980, and 1981) while the level of volatility appears to move in the opposite direction of the tax change for four of the events (1945, 1975, 1978, and 1979) . Only four of the nine estimates are statistically significant at acceptable levels and there is no consistent pattern among these four estimates.
It may very well be that the observed changes in volatility are the result of market wide changes in volatility unrelated to changes in the STT rate. Prior to 1975, trading occurred when brokers contacted other brokers who were listed as trading a stock on the Pink Sheets. Quotes on the Pink Sheets were often stale and therefore closing prices were impossible to estimate. Beginning in 1975, NASDAQ automated the Pink Sheets for a large number of stocks and allowed for contemporaneous quote updating. Closing prices were based on the midpoint of the closing spread until 1980. At that time, NASDAQ market makers began reporting their trades contemporaneously and closing prices could therefore be determined. of the empirical papers listed in Table 1 . There appears to be no statistically significant relationship between the level of an STT and volatility.
In Panel A we examine the absolute changes in volatility. However, this may not be appropriate measure of volatility if volatility varies across the NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ portfolios. Therefore, in Panel B we present results for proportional changes in volatility. The first two columns in Panel B list the date and event tested and the percent change in the STT for a $5 stock. The next three columns list the parameter estimates, followed by the R 2 in the last column.
The parameter of interest is 2 which measures the proportional change in NYSE/AMEX volatility relative to NASDAQ following a change in the STT. For four (1975, 1979, 1980, 1981) of the five events examined in Panel B, NYSE/AMEX volatility moves in the same direction as the STT change, however, only one parameter estimate is statistically significant. In particular, for the 1979 event, NYSE/AMEX volatility is on average 93% of NASDAQ volatility before the 30% rebate, but falls to 85% (0.927 -0.076) of NASDAQ volatility after the STT decline. Thus, the results reported in Panel B agree with our previous findings, in that there appears to be no consistent statistically significant relationship between the level of an STT and volatility.
The next market quality measure we examine is spread width. This measure has not been previously examined in the extant literature. Since bid and ask data is not available for US stocks prior to the 1990s, we employ the Holden low frequency measure described in Holden (2009 Table 4 , we conclude that an STT has a direct relationship with spread width. That is, imposing or increasing an STT will be associated with wider spreads. For both the univariate and multivariate tests, consistent with our hypothesis, the 1933 event exhibits a larger change in spread than the 1932 event, indicating that per share taxes result in larger market quality changes than par value tax changes since the latter can be managed by corporations through par value changes.
Given the inverse relationship between spread width and volume documented in previous literature, and given that we find spreads to have a significant direct relationship with changes in STT levels, we would also expect volume to have an inverse relationship. Of the five papers listed in Table 1 We therefore examine both market share and volume for the NYSE and regional exchanges in Table 5 . Listed is the average market share and monthly share volume for each exchange before and after each New York STT change.
During the time period of our study an increasing portion of regional stock exchange volume was in NYSE listed stocks. 30 Therefore, we expect that regional stock exchange market share would increase (decrease) when New York State increases (decreases) the level of the STT. However, because the New York
State tax was applied as long as part of the transaction took place within the state (i.e. if the location of the exchange, contra broker or transfer agent is in New York or if the stock seller is domiciled in New York) and most brokers and transfer agents were located in New York, it may have been difficult for investors to shift their trading and avoid the STT. We find that for five of the nine STT changes (1933, 1945, 1966, 1975, and 1978) 
VI. Conclusion
Security transaction taxes have been the subject of debate for decades among academics that develop models of the relationship between STTs and market quality, empiricists who examine the relationships for existing taxes, and governments seeking to raise revenue without harming economic growth. In spite of the length of the debate, no consensus has yet been reached. We add to the debate by examining the impact on market quality of nine changes to the New York State STT between the first significant change to it in 1932 and its repeal in
1981.
We find that increasing an STT is accompanied by an increase in transaction costs for investors, a reduction in volume, and higher price impact for trades. We find no consistent relationship that suggests that investors will switch trading to non taxing venues to avoid the tax, but do find that corporations will manage par values in the direction of minimizing taxes if they are based on par value. Finally, we find no support for the notion that STTs reduce volatility.
Our findings largely come down on the side of opponents of the tax who suggest that an STT will harm market quality. Since spreads have been shown to be directly related to a firm's cost of capital, imposing an STT may hinder economic growth by reducing the present value of projected profits. Notes: This appendix summarizes changes in the New York State Security Transaction Tax from its imposition in 1905 to its elimination in 1981. Beginning in 1932 the tax was charged on a per share basis. At various points during the reign of the tax, state residents were taxed differently than non-residents. For these reasons we list the effective tax for New York State residents (Panel A) and non-residents (Panel B) separately. We also list the effective tax per share for stocks of different prices as listed in tax legislation. In both Panels, P is the security price and the last column indicates the general direction of the tax rate. between April and November regional exchanges join the Intermarket Trading system which gives them a rebate on the tax for orders placed through them to New York. Accordingly we define the post period as December 1978 through June 1979. For each event we list the percentage change in the security transaction tax for a stock with a market price and par value of $5. Descriptive statistics given for both samples include the cross-sectional average price per share on the day prior to each event, the average market value (millions) on the day prior to each event and the standard deviation of daily equally weighted portfolio returns for the trading period prior to each event. transaction tax for a stock with a market price of $5.
We define volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns for the period before ( pre  ) and the period after where is the daily portfolio return standard deviation of the NASDAQ sample regressed on its 12 lags. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. , where Vol is traded volume for stock i on day t, σ is the standard deviation of daily returns, and Dummy takes the value 0 pre-event and 1 post event. The parameter estimate is followed by the Newey-West Autocorrelation consistent t-statistic. R-squares are also reported for each event. ***, **,* Denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and the 0.10 level respectively. Where rit and $Volumei,t are the stock return and dollar volume for stock i on day t, respectively. Listed are the results of univariate tests for changes in the measure. ***, **,* Denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and the 0.10 level respectively.
